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A Durable Question 
Charles Tilly, Durable Inequality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998). 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, fourteen-year old boys from the 
families of London's unemployed measured ten inches shorter than their aris- 
tocratic and gentry counterparts. Stature, as Charles Tilly remarks in beginning 
Durable Inequality, was in part a product of childhood health and nutrition and 
also a mark of body strength and the capacity for work; it predicted morbidity 
and mortality (2-3). The costs of inequality, of having too little, like the bene- 
fits of consuming more, were and continue to be visible as people pass in the 
streets and crowds. 
In measuring height and in foretelling life opportunities, the difference 
between short and tall is relational. As an illustration of inequality, its example 
reveals some of the strengths and limitations of Charles Tilly's important study 
of inequality, first presented as the 1995 Irene Flecknoe Ross Lectures at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, and revised for publication as Durable 
Inequality. For Tilly, not only are the outcomes of inequalities relational, but so 
too are their creation and perpetuation. 
His study, carefully framed, is a theoretical inquiry into the organizational 
practices that produce inequalities. Tilly does not question the origins of 
inequality generally. Instead, he asks about the causes, processes, and conse- 
quences of durable inequalities, those persisting over lifetimes and organiza- 
tional histories, that distinguish the relations of different socially defined cate- 
gories of people. Such inequalities, he argues, arise from and are reproduced by 
the dichotomous categorical distinctions between social groups - white/black, 
malelfemale, citizenfforeigner, MuslidJew, and so on - that people who con- 
trol access to value producing resources impose to solve organizational prob- 
lems. Categorical definitions of social groups along various and at times over- 
lapping criteria secure entitlement and exercise control; they permit some to 
benefit more from social resources than others (6-8). 
Inequalities are made durable, and so persist, because of the continuing 
utility of categories for organizations in facilitating exploitation and because 
advantaged arid disadvantaged groups strategically hoard what opportunities 
they can secure within systems of unequally distributed resources and rewards. 
As well, examples of success teach other organizations the categories that are 
effective and thereby promote their spread through emulation. However reluc- 
tantly, consciously or unconsciously, groups and individuals adapt their daily 
lives and practices to the inequalities from which they benefit or suffer. Once 
in place, inequalities and the mechanisms of exploitation, opportunity hoard- 
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ing, emulation, and adaptation that sustain them are difficult to remedy because 
the transaction costs of finding new, effective criteria for decision-making can 
be high in economic, social, and emotional terms. Categorical definitions 
become cost-effective with repeated use. 
Durable Inequality is a detailed conceptualization of the mechanisms 
whereby organizations employ categorical distinctions to structure and repro- 
duce unequal relations. The platform for this is Tilly's argument that long-last- 
ing inequalities are relational, the consequence of organizational decisions and 
not the sum of the differential contributions of individuals to the production of 
value or the disparities in the amount and worth of the human capital that indi- 
viduals bring to their employment. Nor do they necessarily derive from preju- 
dices (2 1-5). Some might cavil about the difficulty of his abstract classification 
of social relations, or "network configurations," (as chains, hierarchies, triads, 
organizations, or categorical pairs), which are held together by bonds (strong or 
weak), and which engage participants (whose actions vary from shallow or 
deep improvisation to thin or intense ritual depending upon the degree of local- 
ized common knowledge and the availability of scripting) in transactions of 
three possible kinds (gifts, entitlements, or compensation).l This precision in 
dissecting social relations does not always carry through the subsequent dis- 
cussion an4 Tilly admits, even though organizations are designed to structure 
relations along these lines, "people make incessant mistakes" and do not follow 
the rules (47-53). But complex as this model is, it does define the universe of 
possibilities (and counterfactuals) from which decision-makers can create 
organizations that capture valuable resources, lower transaction costs, and 
secure opportunities from outside organizations that permit it to realize mate- 
rial gain from those resources. Hierarchies, when combined with paired cate- 
gories, structure the asymmetrical relations that produce durable inequality 
(62-4). 
By imputing qualitative differences between people on opposing sides of 
definitional boundaries, categories provide justifications, and hence organiza- 
tional stability, for greater or lesser rewards for contributions to the production 
of value. Categories can either be interior to an organization's structure, distin- 
guishing between management and workers, for example. Or, they can be exte- 
rior, conforming to widely recognized criteria such as race, ethnicity, citizen- 
ship, gender, and class. The coherence of interior categories with exterior ones 
reinforces inequality at the same time as it reduces the organization's cost of 
maintaining boundaries: "It borrows potent scripts and common knowledge" 
(76). Categorical boundaries, then, separate the beneficiaries of exploitation 
from those suffer it. They also make it possible for non-elite members to hoard 
opportunities and to exclude the even more disadvantaged. 
South African apartheid provides an example of the coherence of interior 
and exterior categorical boundaries in exploitative relations, from which Tilly 
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generalizes exploitation within capitalist forms and labour markets. That analy- 
sis draws upon Marxist theory, in particular the power of those who own the 
means of production to appropriate the surplus value produced by those who 
must work for them to subsist (87). The importance placed on this materialist 
conception of exploitation and on a labour theory of value has persuaded Erik 
Olin Wright that, despite Tilly's desire to bridge Marx and Weber (7), he 
remains "much closer to the core logic of classical Marxism than he seems pre- 
pared to acknowledge."2 The resemblance suffers, however, as Michael Mann 
has observed, from a reluctance to analyze in any depth capitalist exploitation, 
particularly when it is not entwined with some other system of exploitation.3 In 
fairness, Tilly has explained in various places4 that Durable Inequality is a 
companion to the more empirical study, Work Under Capitalism, CO-authored 
with Chris Tilly, in which such issues are more fully engaged (X). However, 
Tilly does seem reluctant to theorize class, in capitalism or other modes of pro- 
duction, or explicitly to give it priority among other social relations - race, eth- 
nicity, citizenship, and gender - that establish boundaries across which one 
group exploits another. Nor does he speculate about the ways that exploitation 
occurs within other relations, such as gender or race.5 So much recent scholar- 
ship has demonstrated the significance of systems of power other than capital- 
ism in exploitative relations that the challenge to incorporate such arguments 
goes beyond Tilly's acknowledgement of the concatentation of unequal cate- 
gorical differences in durable inequality. To say that emulation and adaptation 
of other forms of categorical inequalities inspire application in other circum- 
stances does not satisfactorily explain the process, as important as that obser- 
vation is and as bountiful as the examples are.6 
A more robust Marxist theorization of exploitation might acknowledge 
that historically capitalist class relations have not constituted a totalizing or 
homogenous social system. Even though growing numbers of people have 
become committed to exchanges of labour power for wages, capitalism has 
adapted to, accommodated itself with, and promoted other forms of productive 
relations, value exchanges, and systems of exploitation. Such a theory must be 
historical, rather than draw upon historicized illustrations; that is it needs to 
explain capitalist exploitation as a relational process, sequential and globaliz- 
ing in its absorption and transformation of other systems of exploitation. It 
should also consider that exploitation does not stop at the point of production, 
where surplus value is produced and appropriated. Rather, it continues with the 
circulation of commodities through which the value of that surplus labour is 
realized in a form that can benefit the exploiters and other powerholders who 
claim their share along the way. 
Tilly does not explicitly theorize the importance of circulation mecha- 
nisms. Nor does he conceptualize the role of other indirect mechanisms and 
effects in any detail. He does acknowledge that "indirect effects matter" (loo), 
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but his argument is that individual differences in human capital are largely "cat- 
egorical experiences compounded and transmitted" (101). But he does not 
incorporate the connections from exploitation of generations of parents at the 
point of production through the daily and generational reproduction of labour 
in oppressed families and degraded neighborhoods into the model of "basic 
causal relationships in categorical inequality" as more than dotted lines (1 15). 
This is the limitation of his reference to the height (and health) differential of 
working-class and ugper-class youths in early nineteenth-century Europe; an 
illustration, no matter how compelling, is not evidence of an importance social 
process. In this regard, as Barabara Laslett has suggested, more attention ought 
to be paid to the family and schools, two organizations in which exploitation 
and inequality are experienced, learned, and perpetuated directly and indirect- 
ly from generation to generation.' 
Tilly's elaboration of opportunity hoarding does suggest one way in which 
direct and indirect effects are related. Drawing upon Max Weber's notion of 
social closure, he argues that non-elite groups attempt to exercise what limited 
control they have over access to productive resources to exclude outsiders from 
their enjoyment.8 Unlike Weber, however, Tilly maintains that the categorical 
boundaries constructed to privilege insiders are ever more difficult to enforce 
the more complex an organization becomes and the more distant their range is 
extended (6-7). Thus, opportunity hoarding frequently is manifest, for example, 
in localized immigrant niches and the consequent categorical identity that is 
created in one place but not another. Tilly explains that Italian migrants from 
Roccasecca to Lyon, France, before the First World War found factory employ- 
ment and over the next generation became distinguished from others in the 
French working class by little more than their names. Their paesani who 
migrated to Mamaroneck, New York, secured a near monopoly in landscape 
gardening and, with businesses and jobs gained through family connection, 
they maintained a strong identification with Italy and a sense of themselves as 
Italian-Americans (147-54). Regrettably, Tilly does not elaborate on the rea- 
sons for one group of Italian migrants to feel the need for group boundaries and 
the extent to which exploiters created limited niches for them (1 89). As Aldon 
Morris has added, such situations are not always benign, and racism should be 
considered as a virulent factor in what Morris terms "superexploitation." 
Blacks in the United States, he contends, "were denied the opportunity to sus- 
tain a black enclave" and enclave building has had a "nasty, bloody, brutish, and 
racist" history.9 Still, Tilly's point, that successful opportunity hoarding may 
enable one non-elite group to exploit a less eligible one, does help to explain 
why some exploited groups develop an interest in the perpetuation of the sys- 
tem of inequality that favours it in relative tems (93). 
Emulation and adaptation fix inequalities in place once they are effective- 
ly created and also facilitate their reproduction. Familiar organizational forms 
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are implemented more cheaply, and "lower transaction costs favor the repro- 
duction of existing organizational models, whatever their origins" (96). 
Moreover, the emulation of a model of exploitation, by making the inequality 
that it promotes appear ubiquitous, contributes to the stability of the original 
and its replications. To the extent that people perceive the given nature of 
inequality so imparted, believe reluctantly that they cannot change it, and adjust 
their routines and expectations in ways that permit sufficient satisfaction, their 
adaptations become personal investments in the perpetuation of systems of 
inequality (191). Tilly's example of these processes, nation building and health 
care, may seem disparate. However, in each illustration exploiters developed 
and emulated organizational models (the nation state; state sanctioned profes- 
sionalization), which permitted room for opportunity hoarding for some of the 
more privileged of the exploited (autonomous regions within the nation; nurs- 
es). Others (citizens; patients) adapted and developed interests in the system. 
Intervention to reduce inequalities, then, encounters resistance. Hortatory 
calls for altruism or increasing individual human capital through education 
does not address the transactional nature of durable inequalities secured 
through categorical differences. More egalitarian structures require not just the 
redistribution of control over resources and the returns accruing from that con- 
trol, but also the replacement of organizational forms creating inequality with 
new and easily adopted alternate forms. Even for these to be possible, the tran- 
sition costs must be lower than the costs of enforcement of categorical bound- 
aries or piecemeal amelioration within existing structures (192). 
Government, too, impedes initiatives for change since the ruling classes 
use the state to promote exploitation and hoard opportunities. Politics, then, is 
another dimension of the general operation of inequality. In understanding the 
politics of inequality, "the big question" for Tilly is "who belongs to the ruling 
classes and how [do] they dispose of surplus value" (193). As well, the issue of 
politics leads Tilly to his most direct discussion of agency and identity, a theme 
less effectively articulated in other sections of his conceptualization. 
Again, however, Tilly's approach to class raises questions. Political partic- 
ipation and influence over the state's promotion of inequality appear to define 
class membership. As he elaborates, "democrats prefer democracy because 
large parts of the citizenry join the ruling classes" (193) and because democra- 
cies "provide more regular channels for movement from exclusion to inclusion" 
than tyrannies or oligarchies. But this definition confuses the methods where- 
by some, no matter how inclusive, secure property rights with the property rela- 
tionship itself as the basis for class membership. Inclusion promotes complici- 
ty in decision-making, not necessarily power over decisions. Some tribute 
might be given to participants in the form of various entitlements, but, in Tilly's 
own terms, these only serve to increase the transition costs of altering inequal- 
ities created and legitimated by the political process. Citizenship is not class.l0 
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This definitional difficulty over class and its relationship to citizenship is 
unfortunate because Tilly's conceptualization of politics provides an otherwise 
perceptive consideration of the role of government in creating and sustaining 
unequal categories, the place of inequality as an issue and force in politics, and 
the ability of political action to change inequality. Questions of citizenship are 
inherently categorical definitions of inclusion and exclusion, who qualifies for 
benefits and participates in governance and who does not - Jim Crow legisla- 
tion, veterans benefits, refugee status, alien internment, and so on are all clear 
examples. The movement for Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provides Tilly with an example of the 
way political action can remove exclusion (204- 12). Social movements delib- 
erately emphasize the "unjust treatment" of worthy, united numerous, and 
committed groups and threaten governments with the withdrawal of support of 
a potentially disruptive constituency, willing to aid the government's domestic 
critics and foreign enemies, even to the point of direct action and rebellion. 
Successful movements construct categorical political identities through a 
process of mystification, which exaggerates the group's strength and worthi- 
ness and claims a history for it beyond its protest (2 14-5). 
His discussion of political identities brings Tilly closest to a historical (or 
metahistorical) theorization of one aspect of inequality. Social movements, he 
argues, like other examples of political entrepreneurship, engage in contentious 
politics by deploying disjoined collective identities. Unlike embedded identi- 
ties (race, gender, class, ethnicity, locality, and such), which inform the routine 
social lives of people, disjoined identities "rarely or never govern everyday 
social activities" (219). Instead, they invoke associational, legal, or national 
affinities across such distances or abstractions that they require organizational 
mediation. The major historical trend in early nineteenth-century European 
politics was away from local contention, which derived from embedded identi- 
ties, to national social movements, which formed disjoined identities." How 
this relates theoretically to other historical trends, such as the maturing of 
industrial capitalism, the removal of feudal vestiges, the democratization of 
government, and changes in patterns of durable inequality, is not elaborated - 
but it should be. Have campaigns for citizenship rights, one wonders, rather 
than for class justice come to be more common as social movements fighting 
inequality under liberal capitalism? 
As impressive as Tilly's conceptualization of durable inequality is, his 
claim that it explains "persistent social inequality whenever and wherever it 
occurs,"l2 is a historical theory only in a limited sense. He means that "recur- 
rent causal mechanisms (- that is, exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emula- 
tion, and adaptation -have been) behind multifarious forms of durable inequal- 
ity" for millennia (230). Change, to the extent that it is placed in this model, is 
organizational change, because organizational forces determine the creation 
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and use of categorical inequality. Elsewhere, Tilly has explained that his con- 
ceptualization of the mechanisms of inequality rests on a "weak functionalist 
argument". Unlike strong functionalist arguments, which risk being teleologi- 
cal and unfalsifiable in explaining social phenomena by the organizational 
necessity of their outcomes, weak arguments contend that decision makers 
evaluate the effectiveness of various possible means and adopt those which best 
achieve their goals, while reproducing the relationships within which decisions 
are made.13 
Tilly's argument might also be described as weakly structuralist; Erik Olin 
Wright has labeled it "combinatorial structuralism," since combinations or con- 
catenations of organizational forms and decisions create structures of inequal- 
ity.14 For Barbara Laslett, this concentration on organizations and categories, 
like other forms of structuralism, renders the model insensitive to human 
agency, and without agency, no place is given to intention, emotion, and con- 
sciousness in driving change. The absence of consciousness or any internal 
contradictions as dynamics for change in theory has led her to conclude that 
Tilly falls much closer to the more pessimistic versions of Weber's bureaucrat- 
ic "iron cages" than to Marx.15 Tilly's response that "Durable Inequality scin- 
tillates with human agency" is an exaggeration, while his contention that "inter- 
acting people produce all of its cause-effect relations" is a simplification of the 
relationship that he sees between structure and agency.16 
Weakly structuralist seems appropriate. A structural force, the organiza- 
tional imperative to reduce transaction costs, is a constant. But his rejection of 
agency, culture, and mentalities as realms autonomous from structure does not 
mean that he thinks that interests, intentions, and agencies can be interpreted 
directly from structures. Rather they are informed by the various repertoires or 
scripts that people learn collectively through historical interaction (24). Thus, 
action is not free or individualistic, but constrained by what people collective- 
ly have come to know historically and culturally from the structures within 
which they live." 
As developed in Durable Inequality, this functionalist and structuralist 
argument does not easily develop explanations of social change. Without a the- 
orization of how modes of exploitation occur and are organized within modes 
of production, there can be no historical theorization of how inequalities 
change as modes of production change, either internally through their matura- 
tion and decay or in relation to other modes of production within a social for- 
mation or in an imperialist system of uneven development. To do so would 
develop a more thorough Marxist theorization of exploitation -which, after all, 
must be a theory of history and change. 
In conclusion, historians may encounter some difficulties engaging 
Durable Inequality. They may object to the abstraction of its argument, its use 
of references to the past as illustrations rather than evidence, and the underde- 
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velopment of historical change in its model. As Michael Hanagan has observed, 
"adapting these arguments to historical research will not be easy."'g But it 
should prove worth the effort. Tilly's emphasis on the relational nature of cate- 
gorical inequality and his precision in conceptualizing the role of organiza- 
tional mechanisms of exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adap- 
tation ought to provide a fruitful foundation for analyzing inequalities in all 
variety of cultural and historical contexts. With studies of this sort, perhaps, a 
clearer understanding of inequality in historical time will be possible. 
David G. Burley 
University of Winnipeg 
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